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REVISITING TAIWAN’S DEFENSE STRATEGY
William S. Murray
China’s recent military modernization has fundamentally altered Taiwan’ssecurity options. New Chinese submarines, advanced surface-to-air mis-
siles, and, especially, short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles have
greatly reduced Taiwan’s geographic advantage. Taipei can no longer expect to
counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner, with Patriot inter-
ceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P-3 maritime pa-
trol aircraft. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy,
emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny
the People’s Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its
weapons systems. This would enable Taipei to deter more effectively Beijing’s
use of coercive force, would provide better means for Taiwan to resist Chinese
attacks should deterrence fail, and would provide the United States additional
time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own
national interest. The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan’s
defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to
unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasingly explicit about its
military modernization objectives. China’s 2004 white paper on national
defense stated that “the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] will . . . enhance the de-
velopment of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force
and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and
warfighting capabilities.”1 The introduction of new classes of advanced surface
warships; the unveiling of new nuclear-powered submarines, tactical fighter air-
craft, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with advanced warheads;
and an antisatellite demonstration—all attest to the determined pursuit of these
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
goals.2 Many analysts believe that China’s near-term purposes are to deter Tai-
wan from declaring independence, to provide leverage by which to coerce a re-
unification with Taiwan if deterrence fails, and to inhibit or delay U.S.
intervention in such a conflict.3
Chinese employment strategies for these new weapons systems and potential
capabilities remain unknown, though statements from senior leaders provide
important hints. For example, President Hu Jintao is said to have stated in Au-
gust 2007 that China had five major military priorities relative to Taiwan: estab-
lishing military readiness, conducting demonstrative exercises, “imposing a
blockade on the Taiwan Strait,” “carrying out combined firepower attacks,” and
“[conducting a] cross-sea landing.”4 Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central
Military Commission, boasted in March 2008, “We have the resolve and capabil-
ity to deal with a major ‘Taiwan independence’ incident at any time.”5 The likely
use of force would encompass three components: long-range precision bom-
bardment, invasion, and blockade. These attack mechanisms would also likely
be conducted in close coordination, not independently.6 Taiwan faces the daunt-
ing challenge of how best to deny China the fulfillment of these objectives.
Previous studies of potential China-Taiwan conflict scenarios have con-
cluded that Taiwan (either acting alone or with the assistance of the U.S. mili-
tary) could defeat PRC coercion, thus presumably ensuring reliable deterrence.7
Several of these studies have asserted that the Second Artillery (the PRC’s strate-
gic rocket force) possessed only a limited inventory of relatively inaccurate
short-range missiles with which to attack Taiwan, restricting its role to what
Robert Pape calls “coercion by punishment,” terrorizing or inflicting pain on the
population—a strategy that observers like Pape argue is rarely successful.8 These
circumstances, however, have now changed profoundly. Over the past decade
China has greatly enhanced its capacity to “reach” Taiwan with far more accurate
and decisive capabilities, and recent analyses question Taiwan’s near-term abil-
ity to resist coercive force.9
For example, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of increasingly accurate ballistic
missiles can quickly, and with complete surprise, cripple or destroy high-value
military assets, including aircraft on the ground and ships at piers. This emer-
gent capability, plus the acquisition of long-range surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), suggests that the PRC has shifted its anti-Taiwan military strategy away
from coercion by punishment toward denying Taiwan the use of its air force and
navy.10 Taiwan therefore faces a threat against which it has not adequately pre-
pared and that offers the PRC a real prospect of achieving success before the
United States could intervene. This is a very worrisome development.
Taiwan’s responses to China’s enhanced capabilities remain highly conflicted,
a situation that reflects the deep political disagreements that shape Taipei’s
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military policies. Taipei decreased its defense budgets in absolute and relative
terms from 1993 until 2003, with only meager improvements thereafter.11 These
diminished efforts hardly seem commensurate with the increased threat that
Taiwan confronts. They suggest either a state of denial about the threat, a
gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic
advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is cer-
tain to provide timely military assistance. Despite this ambivalence and its ane-
mic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United
States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile sys-
tems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and
diesel submarines. Taiwan is also reportedly attempting to develop offensive
counterstrike capabilities indigenously, including the 360-mile-range
Hsung-Feng IIE cruise missile.
Both approaches represent serious misperceptions of the threats posed to
Taiwan and a misallocation of budgetary resources. The PAC-3s and other po-
tential purchases are expensive, and they concentrate Taiwan’s defense dollars
on a limited range of capabilities that China is increasingly able to defeat. Offen-
sive counterstrike weapons, furthermore, are potentially destabilizing, since
China would have difficulty determining if such strikes originated from Ameri-
can or Taiwanese platforms. They are also unlikely to be acquired in numbers
sufficient to deter China.12
More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense
against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless avail-
able, but to take advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies.
Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3
SAMs, Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical
infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range
precision bombardment.13 Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither
of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan
should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with
mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade,
Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would al-
low it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Fi-
nally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could
include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a
countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons
aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.
Such shifts constitute a “porcupine strategy.” They would offer Taiwan a way
to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months without presuming imme-
diate U.S. intervention.14 This shift in strategy might also be less provocative to
M U R R A Y 1 5
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the PRC than Taiwan’s current policy of offensive defense. A porcupine strategy
would enhance deterrence, in that a Taipei truly prepared to defend itself would
be able to thwart a decapitation attempt—thereby discouraging Beijing from
acting militarily. Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United
States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted. Washington
could avoid a reflexive decision that would draw it into a war against a major
power that had systematically prepared for just such a contingency for more
than a decade.
This article has five principal parts. The first summarizes the history and ra-
tionale of the 2001 U.S. arms offer to Taiwan and explains why the weapons sales
proposed are unsuited to the effective defense of the island. The second section
outlines how China would probably attempt to destroy or neutralize the Taiwan
air force and navy, and it proposes an alternative strategy for countering China’s
increasingly precise short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and
manned tactical aircraft. The third part explores how Beijing’s invasion options
would change if Taipei lost its navy and the use of its air force. The fourth section
examines PRC blockade options against Taiwan and suggests how Taiwan could
more effectively deny China its blockade objectives. The concluding section
considers the impediments to, and repercussions of, adoption by Taiwan of a
“porcupine defense.”
WHATEVER IT TAKES: THE 2001 U.S. ARMS SALE OFFER
In April 2001, reversing twenty years of American policy, the George W. Bush
administration offered to provide to Taiwan eight diesel submarines for U.S.
$12.3 billion.15 This was part of a larger offer that also included six batteries of
PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for an additional $4.3 billion and twelve P-3C
maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft at $1.6 billion.16 This potential sale
evoked predictably strong opposition from the mainland, stirred extensive in-
ternal Taiwanese debate, and brought significant American pressure on Taiwan
to assent to these purchases.17 For example, Richard Lawless, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that “the passage of this
budget is a litmus test of Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense”;18 he also
warned Taipei of “repercussions” if it failed to approve the arms purchase.19
One early version of the proposal also envisioned Taiwan buying new P-3Cs.20
This would have required restarting a production line that had closed in 1990, at a
cost of some $300 million per plane.21 Many in Taiwan viewed the totality of this
package as exorbitant.22 Indeed, the leader of Taiwan’s People First Party likened it to
extortion by American mafiosi in exchange for protection from Chinese thugs.23
The combination of high cost and intense divisiveness produced political theater
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and gridlock;24 proposals to fund the package were defeated some sixty times be-
tween 2004 and 2007.25 Six bitter years of stonewalling, stalemate, and wrangling
finally ended in June 2007 with passage of watered-down legislation allocating a
billion dollars to purchase rebuilt P-3 aircraft and upgrade Taiwan’s existing SAM
systems of the less advanced PAC-2 type, probably to PAC-3 standards.26 The Leg-
islative Yuan, however, allocated only about six million dollars to fund contin-
ued feasibility studies on the U.S. diesel submarine deal, thereby postponing or
even killing it.27
The military rationale underlying the original arms package was one of a clas-
sic symmetrical response to perceived threats. Thus the P-3C Orion aircraft,
which specialize in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and open-ocean surveillance,
could defend Taiwan from China’s modernizing fleet of diesel and nuclear sub-
marines. Similarly, eight modern diesel submarines would presumably defend
against the PRC’s increasingly impressive and capable surface forces and subma-
rines. Finally, the PAC-3 would seemingly offer a viable defense for critical tar-
gets against Beijing’s expanding inventory of short-range ballistic missiles,
attack aircraft, and highly accurate land-attack cruise missiles.28 Yet closer analy-
sis suggests that none of these three weapons systems serve Taiwan’s current or
immediate future defense needs, that each would be acutely vulnerable to exist-
ing Chinese weapons and for Taipei would therefore be a major misallocation of
resources. To support this conclusion I will review the presumed role of various
potential capabilities in relation to the likely employment of Chinese
capabilities.
PAC-2 and PAC-3 SAMs versus China’s SRBMs
Taiwan clearly faces a major challenge in defending against Chinese short-range
ballistic missiles. In 2005 Taiwan had an inventory of approximately two hun-
dred earlier PAC-2 interceptors in three batteries.29 Each PAC battery consists of
a multifunction phased-array radar, an engagement control station, communi-
cations gear, and eight launchers with four missiles per launcher, plus one reload
each. In theory, these three batteries of PAC-2 missiles could destroy up to 192
(that is, 3 × 8 × 4 × 2) Chinese SRBMs. SAM firing doctrine, however, mandates
shooting two missiles against each target to increase the odds of success.30 The
downside of this enhanced kill probability is that it effectively halves the in-
ventory of interceptors and doubles the cost of each attempted intercept. Un-
less Taiwan were to increase its inventory of PAC missiles hugely, it can
expect to shoot down with the PAC-2 interceptors already in inventory at
most ninety-six of the SRBMs targeted against it, or as many as 192 if Taipei
upgrades all its current PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 capabilities (which have
sixteen missiles per launcher). Even this would allow over nine hundred of
M U R R A Y 1 7
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China’s 2007 inventory of a thousand SRBMs to arrive unchallenged at their
targets.
Patriot interceptors are useless unless guided by the PAC radar. China could
target these radars with SRBMs, cruise missiles, homing antiradiation missiles
fired from tactical aircraft, or even Harpy antiradar drones launched from the
mainland. Taiwan would then have to devote SAMs to defending the PAC radar,
thus reducing the number available for defending airfields, leadership sites, crit-
ical infrastructure, or other key facilities.
Additionally, a PAC-3 installation protecting a particularly valuable target
(e.g., Tsoying naval base) could be saturated and overwhelmed by large numbers
of SRBMs. China could also initially fire older, less precise weapons to deplete
Taiwan’s inventory of interceptors, following them closely with unimpeded pre-
cision attacks using more accurate missiles. Mark Stokes, a close observer of
China’s Second Artillery, also notes that Beijing may have “a terminal guidance
system that could preclude engagement by terminal missile defenses,” such as
Patriot interceptors.31
One argument commonly used to dismiss the threat posed by SRBMs is that
the ballistic warheads lack the accuracy necessary for precision targeting. In a
2000 publication, for example, Michael O’Hanlon observed that the reported in-
accuracy—a three-hundred-meter circular error probable (CEP)—of China’s
SRBMs made them little more than terror weapons.32 However, O’Hanlon de-
rived that estimate from 1999 and earlier sources; since then China has greatly
improved the accuracy of its missiles, as well as the number in its inventory. Au-
thoritative judgments are classified, but Thomas Christensen noted in 2001 that
internal PLA sources assumed that the Second Artillery would be able to support
accurate, concentrated attacks on enemy military assets.33 Jane’s in 2005 esti-
mated China was producing ballistic missiles with CEPs of forty meters.34 Mark
Stokes wrote in 2006 that “at least 10 years ago, PRC missile engineers had been
tasked to meet an accuracy requirement of below 50 meters circular error proba-
bility (CEP).”35 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported in September
2007 that China’s SRBMs could strike within forty meters of their intended tar-
gets.36 The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides accuracy to within
a few meters over most of the earth’s surface, would be available to Beijing’s
weapons during all phases of launch and flight.37 Further, the U.S. Navy’s Office
of Naval Intelligence also reported in 2004 that China is building ballistic mis-
siles that can target large ships at sea; in 2006 it stated that these maneuvering
warheads were guided by either infrared or radar seekers.38 These reports reflect
a growing consensus that China has mastered the engineering and manufactur-
ing challenges involved in fielding highly accurate ballistic-missile warheads.
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China’s ballistic missiles are therefore no longer weapons for frightening popu-
lations but precision munitions. The Second Artillery’s SRBMs provide the PLA
the capability to destroy very large numbers of fixed targets with little or no
warning.39
P-3s versus China’s Submarines
Taiwan’s purchase of P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft appears to make more
sense. P-3s have a proven capability to find submarines; China has a large sub-
marine fleet, over fifty diesel and nine or more nuclear submarines; and Taiwan’s
1960s-vintage S-2 Tracker ASW aircraft is hopelessly obsolete.40 Japan, another
island state facing similar strategic imperatives, has up to 110 P-3s.41 In reality,
however, twelve P-3C aircraft will make little or no difference against China’s
submarine fleet. The reason is straightforward: P-3 aircraft require secure air-
fields from which to fly, but Taiwan will probably lose its airfields in the opening
salvos of any all-out war with China. Air superiority will be doubtful. Further, a
dozen P-3s can patrol only a fraction of the waters in which China’s submarines
could operate against Taiwan, and this fraction would be very likely reduced by
combat losses. Twelve P-3s will have meaningful reconnaissance and maritime
patrol roles to play during peacetime and scenarios of limited conflict, through
their ability to conduct wide-area searches, but they will have little wartime
utility.
Taiwan’s Diesel Submarines versus the People’s Liberation Army Navy
Diesel submarines can conduct effective operations against an opposing navy
and merchant fleet, but only when they are used offensively. Admittedly, there
are examples of diesel submarines effectively defending home or nearby waters.
One is the Argentine Type 209 diesel submarine that operated against the Royal
Navy during the 1982 Falklands War. Although making a number of attacks
against surface and submarine contacts, it failed to damage any British ships.
The Royal Navy, meanwhile, expended nearly its entire inventory of ASW weap-
ons against the boat without sinking or disabling it.42
Conversely, there are many examples of effective employment of diesel sub-
marines in offensive operations. The U.S., German, and British submarine
forces have all excelled offensively. Yet technological developments after World
War II dramatically altered the operational role of diesel submarines—they can
no longer prowl for targets at relatively high speeds on the surface, submerging
only to attack. Diesel submarines must now remain submerged, where their bat-
tery capacity forces them to hunt at low speeds—approximately four knots.
They must also transit slowly to locations where enemy vessels might eventually
deploy—geographic choke points, sea-lanes, and the waters around enemy har-
bors and naval bases being the most likely.
M U R R A Y 1 9
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It is also erroneous to view diesel submarines as effective antisubmarine sys-
tems. A diesel submarine can, if equipped with appropriate torpedoes, attack
another submarine, but modern submarines are very quiet and exceedingly dif-
ficult to detect. The Congressional Research Service, for example, reports that
some Kilo-class diesel submarines are quieter than improved Los Angeles–class
nuclear submarines.43 This suggests that properly maintained, modern diesel
submarines can be detected at ranges varying from two hundred yards to four
nautical miles.44 By maritime standards, these are very short distances. Diesel
submarines, therefore, cannot reasonably expect to find other quiet submarines
at long ranges.
Thus the importance of the low speeds of diesel submarines. If they can de-
tect opponents only at ranges of a few miles, they will take a considerable
amount of time to search large areas effectively. Furthermore, the hunting diesel
submarine might well be itself detected and attacked by the hunted boat. Having
no marked advantages in detection range, search speed, or quietness over oppo-
nents, diesel submarines cannot hope to become effective ASW platforms. Die-
sel submarines are therefore really specialists in antisurface warfare, mining, and
intelligence gathering. These are all offensively oriented missions.
During a conflict, Taiwan would likely maximize the effectiveness of its sub-
marines by either laying mines against Chinese ports or by attacking with torpe-
does or cruise missiles warships leaving their bases. This would provide a much
higher probability of success against People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
vessels than would the defensive tactic of waiting in or around Taiwanese waters
for them. But China would have difficulty determining the origin of any result-
ing attacks and could attribute them to the United States, particularly any by
Mark 48 torpedoes, which were included in the 2001 arms sale offer and a vari-
ant of which is carried by American submarines.45 Such a contingency seems un-
necessarily escalatory, especially since there are other, purely defensive and
nonescalatory, alternatives that could more quickly offer Taiwan equal or better
deterrence and at lesser cost.
TAIWAN’S VULNERABLE NAVY AND AIR FORCE
Taiwan’s navy could probably fight the PLAN effectively. It possesses highly ad-
vanced equipment, including four Kidd-class destroyers and Harpoon antiship
and SM-2 antiair missiles; its officers and men have a reputation for compe-
tence.46 In consequence, China can be expected to look for a way to defeat this
force decisively without a campaign of symmetrical, force-on-force attrition. A
surprise, long-range, precision bombardment on Taipei’s navy while it is in port
seems a clear choice. Beijing would need sufficient weapon accuracy, availability,
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and reliability, as well as targeting information, but all of these are now within
the PRC’s technical ability.
As mentioned above, problems of accuracy that used to characterize Beijing’s
long-range weapons have likely been solved. Accurate weaponry is useless with-
out knowledge of the precise location of targets, but targeting Taiwan’s surface
combatants in port is increasingly easy. In the age of Google Earth, the latitude
and longitude of naval piers at Tsoying, Suau, and Taiwan’s other naval bases are
easy to determine exactly, and these piers are finite in number. Moreover, many
of Taiwan’s naval bases are also commercial ports, suggesting that direct obser-
vation of surface ships within them would be a simple matter. Ships in port
rarely shift berths, so Beijing could readily monitor the location of most, if not
all, of Taiwan’s surface combatants in port on a day-to-day basis.47
If Beijing knew that Taipei’s destroyers were tied up to a given pier, it could
readily program cruise or ballistic missiles to strike the appropriate aim points.
Even if jamming denies GPS and similar signals, technology like laser radar
guidance allows automatic target recognition.48 Deficiencies in accuracy can
also be compensated for by submunitions, which can damage targets within a
larger area. China has developed ballistic-missile-deployed submunitions since
at least 2000.49 Submunitions designed to penetrate and damage runways, which
China has almost certainly developed for its SRBMs, would also be highly effec-
tive against moored naval vessels.50
Unclassified information regarding China’s weapons-system reliability is not
available. But technological shortfalls no longer plague China’s space program
or significantly retard its ability to manufacture dependable high-technology
consumer products such as memory chips, digital processors, digital cameras,
cell phones, or personal computers. China thus seems increasingly capable of
achieving adequate weapons-system reliability. Producing sufficient numbers of
weapons is also well within the PRC’s technical and budgetary capacities. Devot-
ing, say, a hundred SRBMs to the destruction or crippling of Taiwan’s navy
would likely be a fruitful allocation of China’s inventory of precision weapons.
Taiwan’s air force is also threatened by long-range precision bombardment,
but by different means.51 The Taiwan air force has nine air bases, from which ap-
proximately 145 F-16, fifty-six Mirage 2000, and 131 F-CK-1A Indigenous De-
fense Fighters operate.52 An examination of the air bases using Google Earth
shows upward of four hundred protected revetments at these nine bases, ap-
proximately half of them covered and perhaps hardened.53 This gives credence to
the reports of underground hangars at Ta-Shan Air Base in Hualien that report-
edly can protect over half of Taiwan’s tactical fighter aircraft. Other under-
ground shelters exist at Taitung Air Base and perhaps elsewhere.54 The table
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describes results of open-source satellite imagery examination of Taiwan’s air
bases.
Any Chinese attempt to destroy individual aircraft in hardened shelters
would be hindered by the large number of targets. The Second Artillery might
have to devote at least one highly accurate unitary warhead to each covered air-
craft revetment. This allocation of over two hundred missiles could be wasted,
however, if Taiwan did not place any aircraft in these revetments but instead
parked them in the open to defeat such targeting. Such dispersed aircraft, how-
ever, would be vulnerable to SRBM-delivered fragmenting submunitions. This
too would be an inefficient use of a potentially large percentage of the Second
Artillery’s short-range ballistic missiles, and neither method would threaten any
aircraft protected in underground shelters.
A better option for the Chinese would be to target the runways with warheads de-
signed to crater them and so prevent Taiwan’s aircraft from taking off.55 For example,a
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
TAIWAN’S AIR BASES
Air Base
Latitude/
Longitude
Runways
(Taxi)
Runway
Length ×
Width (ft)*
Warheads Shelters Revetments Tunnels
Taoyuan
250319/
1211431
1 (1) 10,015 × 145 8 41 46 0
Hsinchu
244905/
1205621
1 (2) 11,955 × 148 12 43 11 0
Ta-Shan
240148/
1213629
1 (1) 7,959 × 140 5 0 0 8
Chashan
240109/
1213652
1 (2) 9,022 × 148 8 23 10 0
Chiayi
232747/
1202329
2 (1)
10,007 × 148
5,307 × 74
9 34 37 0
Tainan
225700/
1201220
2 (1)
10,007 × 148
10,007 × 148
8 43 50 0
Kangshan
224657/
1201553
2 (1)
8,019 × 145
7,435 × 145
6 4 0 0
Ching
Chuan
Kang
241525/
1203738
1 (2) 12,000 × 148 12 31 16 0
Taitung
241104/
1203914
1 (1) 11,055 × 147 8 29 0 12
Sungshan
250353/
1213303
1 (1) 8,578 × 197 5 0 0 0
Makung
243409/
1193747
1 (1) 9,843 × 148 8 4 8 0
Total 14 (14) 89 252 178 20
* Nearly all runway data in this table are taken from posted airport information on Google Earth. Information not provided was determined using Google Earth.
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loaded F-16 apparently requires approximately 2,500 feet of uninterrupted run-
way to take off; U.S. doctrine, however, demands a fifty-by-five-thousand-foot
minimum operating strip for tactical aircraft operations.56 Taiwan’s air bases
have fourteen runways ranging from 5,307 to 11,995 feet long, and these strips
are on average approximately 150 feet wide. If China’s SRBMs are sufficiently ac-
curate and reliable, six unitary warheads each creating a fifty-foot crater could
cut a 12,000-by-148-foot runway into six segments, each smaller than a U.S.
minimum operating strip.57 Where taxiways could also serve as runways, they
would also have to be cratered. Using this logic, China would have to devote at
least eighty-nine perfectly accurate warheads (see the “warheads” column of the
table) to Taiwan’s runways and taxiways to prevent their use by tactical aircraft.
The PRC cannot rely on 100 percent SRBM reliability and accuracy, but some-
thing between a hundred and two hundred unitary warheads could deny Taiwan
the use of its air bases for a while. This number would be greater if accuracy and
reliability were poor and ballistic missile defenses were effective; conversely, it
could be smaller if China has runway-penetrating submunitions, tactical air-
craft or cruise missiles can reliably deliver antirunway munitions, or fighter air-
craft require longer takeoff or landing distances than assumed.58
China has reportedly acquired runway-penetrating bombs from Russian
sources.59 It also seems likely that the Second Artillery has developed
rocket-delivered warheads. A Google Earth image at 40°29'20" north lati-
tude, 93°30'02" east longitude, depicts what is likely Chinese testing of a
concrete-penetrating submunition warhead. Mark Stokes asserts that in fact
the Second Artillery already has runway-penetrating submunitions, termi-
nally guided.60 In any case, there is little reason to doubt that China has developed
suitably accurate antirunway weapons to support such a campaign as envisioned
here. As a point in evidence, Taiwan recognizes that its runways present a critical
vulnerability and has acquired the ability to repair them rapidly under combat
conditions.61 Disturbingly, however, as late as 2007 at least one Taiwan airfield’s
runway repair capabilities consisted of “a pile of gravel and pile of sand at the
apex of the runways. Both piles were uncovered, exposed to the elements, and
obviously had been very long in place; furthermore, there was no earthmoving
equipment stored anywhere near the piles.”62 Effective rapid runway repair dur-
ing sustained ballistic missile strikes requires highly trained and motivated
teams. If Taiwan has established and maintained such teams, it should be able to
keep some of its airfields operable. Observers might be forgiven doubts, however,
given other manning problems that afflict Taiwan’s military.63
Among those problems is a shortage of pilots. For nearly a decade Taiwan has
struggled to maintain a ratio of one pilot to one modern fighter aircraft. Bernard
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Cole relates that Taiwan’s minister of defense has seriously considered mothball-
ing some of its Mirage 2000s in an effort to increase the pilot-to-plane ratio.64
Attrition among pilots by any means would be a very serious matter.
Finally, Taiwan has on at least two occasions conducted exercises in which
tactical aircraft flew from highways.65 Yet this expedient incurs a host of logistics
problems, very low sortie rates, and increased vulnerabilities to traditional,
fifth-column, or PRC special operations forces attacks.66
The key point is simple and sobering: the Second Artillery’s expanding inven-
tory of increasingly accurate SRBMs probably allows Beijing to incapacitate
much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of the air force in
a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.
An Invitation to Invasion?
Hypothetical Chinese invasion fleets have always been presumed to risk devasta-
tion by Taipei’s highly regarded air force. Yet even if Taiwan’s fighters could take
to the air and conduct coordinated defensive operations after suffering a
long-range precision bombardment, they would still have to prevail against the
Chinese air force and navy’s growing inventory of fourth-generation Su-27,
Su-30, J-10, and J-11 aircraft, all with impressive antiair capabilities. Other mor-
tal threats include Beijing’s four (soon to be eight) batteries firing the
land-based S-300 PMU2 surface-to-air missile, which with its 120-mile range
can reach nearly across the Strait of Taiwan and make penetration of China’s air-
space “difficult if not impossible” with F-16s and F-15s.67 This difficulty could
be exacerbated by the ninety-mile SA-20, which China is sending to sea on its
pair of Luzhou-class destroyers, and by the fifty-four-mile HHQ-9 SAMs on
both of its Luyang II destroyers.68 Combined, these weapons systems could ef-
fectively defend an invasion fleet against any tactical aircraft that got airborne.
It is also widely assessed that Beijing lacks the amphibious lift required to
conduct a successful invasion. A spate of recent mainland amphibious-ship con-
struction, however, suggests that Beijing continues to pursue that option. The
launching and outfitting of the Yazhou-class landing ship (LPD) in 2006 and
2007 at Shanghai’s Hudong shipyard means that shortly an invasion fleet would
have helicopter and air-cushion-vehicle support.69 An additional invasion capa-
bility will be gained if China acquires from Russia the sixty-knot Zubr-class am-
phibious hovercraft, which can carry three main battle tanks, ten armored
personnel carriers, or 140 troops. Long-swirling rumors of the impending sale
of six or more are gaining credibility.70 Further, the ten Yuting-II tank landing
ships built during 2003 and 2004 increased China’s inventory of that type by ap-
proximately 50 percent.71 The total number of amphibious vessels required to
support a Taiwan invasion is debated; it depends on attrition rates, weather,
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loading and unloading times, the use of civilian shipping, availability of
off-loading infrastructure in Taiwan, Taiwan’s will to resist, and other factors
both physical and subjective.72 Regardless, it is apparent that China has not for-
saken an invasion option and has the ability to develop rapidly additional am-
phibious forces.
Rethinking Taiwan’s Defenses
Taiwan can do little to prevent a Chinese bombardment by many hundreds, even
thousands, of precision-guided munitions. Taipei might have a better payoff,
therefore, in seeking not to defeat the incoming warheads but to prevent the at-
tack from achieving its objectives. For instance, one technologically unsophisti-
cated and relatively affordable measure would be to harden key civil and military
facilities—burying them or constructing concrete shelters that can withstand
multiple direct hits.73 This would be especially important for civilian leadership
facilities, military command posts, and communications systems. It could even
be done for Taiwan’s three Patriot interceptor sites, which, Google Earth reveals,
are in the open. Keeping the launchers and radars in caves or hardened bunkers
would cause Beijing to devote more warheads to them. Also, having survived
the initial bombardment, the launchers could be rolled out to protect against
follow-on harassment strikes by SRBMs, cruise missiles, and tactical aircraft.
The same logic would further suggest redundancy of critical infrastruc-
ture—such as food and water distribution systems, medical services, wartime
command and control, warning radars, or civil defense information networks.
However, Taiwan’s electrical grid is particularly vulnerable. For example, the
magnitude 7.6 earthquake that struck central Taiwan on 21 September 1999 re-
sulted in a complete loss of electricity in the northern half of the island. A major
cause was heavy damage to the Chungliao electrical substation, “a major hub in
the island’s high voltage transmission network that directs 45% of the north’s
power demand.”74 Attacks on this attractive target could be resisted either by
distribution redundancy or emergency generators (with fuel) to supply vital
networks and facilities during and after a bombardment. Tax incentives or
building-code revisions could help create such capacity.75
As a further example, Taiwan could complicate China’s targeting. Decoys
are an excellent and affordable way to do so. In 1999 Serbia reportedly misled
many NATO precision-guided munitions with such primitive ruses as simu-
lated tanks made of wood and tarpaulins.76 Taiwan could complicate Beijing’s
targeting options with radar emitters that seduce homing antiradiation mis-
siles, inflatable “missile launchers,” and the like. Properly done, these measures
could cause the Second Artillery to waste a large percentage of its warheads on
false targets.
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Another worthwhile alternative to trying to shoot down ballistic warheads
would be making critical targets mobile. Fixed targets are relatively easy to lo-
cate and destroy with precision weaponry (unless buried or hardened), but
mobile targets are not, as the United States discovered in its unsuccessful hunt
for Scuds in the Iraqi western desert during the first Gulf War.77 An option
would be for Taiwan to move its Patriot radars frequently between several sites.
For its part, the navy could consider frequently shifting its ships’ berths, increas-
ing the time they spend at sea, or even anchoring them in its ports, especially in
time of heightened tensions.78 Another option would be hardened pens for mis-
sile patrol craft, in which they might survive an initial SRBM attack.79 Taipei
could also rotate its fighters between airfields or between hardened shelters, in a
high-stakes analogy to three-card monte. Future weapons acquisitions could
emphasize mobility and concealment.
Beijing’s short-range ballistic missiles are highly accurate, but they are not in-
finite in either destructive power or number.80 In the face of such passive de-
fenses they might well fail, however many struck targets, to achieve the true
purpose for which they were fired—destruction of Taiwan’s ability, or willing-
ness, to resist “regime change.”
Under existing conditions, however, a surprise long-range precision bom-
bardment would likely cost Taiwan its ability to fly useful numbers of tactical
aircraft in a coordinated manner or to sortie its navy. This prospect has impor-
tant implications. For one, it suggests that additional tactical fixed-wing aircraft
requiring long runways would not be a wise investment. If their mission would
be countering invasion and (more important) preventing the PRC from using
its own aircraft in a bombardment, invasion, or blockade, Taiwan would do
better to invest more in mobile SAM systems. For instance, Taiwan reportedly
has 162 medium-range Improved Hawk missiles but as few as five launchers.81
The surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (SLAMRAAM),
a truck-mounted version of the highly capable AIM-120 AMRAAM, if acquired
and integrated with existing systems, would significantly enhance Taiwan’s
antiair capability.82 Taiwan could enhance its short-range man-portable and
truck-mounted air-defense systems, such as the Stinger, Avenger (a truck-borne
Stinger), and Chaparral; they might be stored in hardened or disguised shelters
and frequently moved between them. These steps would greatly complicate tar-
geting and help deny China air superiority in the aftermath of a major bombard-
ment. On this view, further investments in fixed-site surface-to-air missiles, such
as Taiwan’s silo-based Sky Bow 1, would seem unwise due to their vulnerability to
precision-guided munitions, unless they can withstand multiple direct hits.
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REPELLING AN INVASION
An all-out Chinese campaign to topple the Taiwan government might combine
bombardment with invasion. If Taiwan’s navy and air force were neutralized or
destroyed by the bombardment, the army would have to repulse or defeat an in-
vasion alone. There are several weapons—all affordable and unambiguously
defensive in nature—that, if purchased, could greatly improve its chances of
doing so.
At the top of this list are mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs),
such as truck-mounted Harpoons. A fairly small number of these missiles
would likely devastate China’s armor-carrying amphibious shipping, which
would have to come well within range, and then stop, to disembark the vehi-
cles. Recent naval history strongly suggests that a vessel loaded with tanks or
armored personnel carriers could be sunk or put out of action by a single
five-hundred-pound (or lighter) high-explosive warhead, such as cruise mis-
siles deliver.83 Thus far, no Chinese amphibious vessel has a robust anti–cruise
missile capability.84 Cruise missiles’ targets could be acquired by mobile ra-
dars.85 Best of all, CDCMs could greatly enhance Taiwan’s ability to destroy an
invasion force without third-party assistance.86
A second class of weaponry that would be highly effective in repelling an in-
vasion comprises attack helicopters, such as the Apache AH-64D. Taiwan, recog-
nizing the utility of helicopters, has sixty-three AH-1A Super Cobras and has set
in motion an initiative to buy thirty Apaches in 2008 from the United States for
an estimated U.S. $2.26 billion.87 These aircraft would be highly effective against
armor that approached in landing craft or got ashore, if adequately protected
during the preparatory bombardment. Additionally, helicopters’ ability to fly
low affords a degree of immunity to long-range surface-to-air missiles.
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is another truck-mounted
weapon that might be appropriate for Taiwan. These mobile launchers could be
readily hidden or sheltered. Equipped with appropriate rockets, their long-range
precision fire could greatly weaken any PLA toeholds.88 They might do so even if
key bridges or roads were impassable; a handful of MLRS sites could cover the
entire island. Advanced tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons should not be left
off this list of effective hardware, but Taiwan already has sizable stocks of most of
them.
Another hardware recommendation, less strictly associated with ground war-
fare, involves surf-zone sea mines. These weapons, designed for waters less than
ten feet deep, are extraordinarily difficult to counter and would bedevil the plan-
ning or execution of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A former commandant of
the U.S. Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, stated in 2002 that “the inability
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to clear mines from the surf zone is the ‘Achilles’ heel of our maneuver force.’”89
U.S. Navy mine warfare officers also attest to their effectiveness and to the speed
and ease of deploying them.90 Since they are lightweight and portable, shallow-
water mines can be quickly and easily moved from secure bunkers to where they
are needed. They are also quite inexpensive, relative to many of the other weap-
ons systems Taiwan might choose.
None of these weapons would be effective if Taiwan’s army were not highly
trained or motivated. Unfortunately, however, its conscript ground forces re-
portedly “suffer from low morale, a poor NCO [noncommissioned officer] pro-
gram and poorly maintained equipment.”91 Also, Taiwan’s reserve forces are very
weak; conscripts serve only fourteen months before entering the reserves.92 In
any case, conscript-based armies are poorly suited to the high-technology com-
bat that would characterize an invasion attempt by the PRC. These problems are
no doubt rooted in structural, social, and political issues beyond the scope of
this article. However, it should be pointed out briefly that the aim of thwarting
the ultimate objectives of a PRC attack (or better, thereby discouraging Beijing
from the attempt) would be best served by an all-volunteer, highly professional
and highly trained army. An all-volunteer army, though consistent with the
stated desires of many elected officials, could not be developed quickly.93 It
would increase personnel costs, but it would also increase the ground force’s de-
terrent value, since it would reduce the likelihood of total collapse at the begin-
ning of hostilities, which numerous informed observers believe is a real
possibility.94
WITHSTANDING A BLOCKADE
If Taiwan’s military and leadership were to ride out a bombardment and repel an
invasion, China might then consider an extended blockade designed to prevent
Taiwan from importing energy.95 The Republic of China would be acutely vul-
nerable to such an action, since it imports over 98 percent of its energy require-
ments. All these fuels pass through easily identifiable bottlenecks, including
off-loading terminals and processing locations that would be susceptible to de-
struction or mining.96 Imported energy is also carried on easily identifiable ship
types, which could be isolated, diverted, or even sunk. Additionally, Taiwan’s re-
finers are required only to maintain crude oil stocks equivalent to thirty days’
demand.97 This all suggests that an energy blockade’s effects would be felt very
quickly throughout Taiwan, and could be severe.
One wonders how long Taipei could resist Beijing’s demands under such con-
ditions. It is equally unclear how a blockade that was preceded by a long-range
precision bombardment could be countered, whatever defensive military
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options Taiwan pursues. A partial solution might lie in the civil, rather than mil-
itary, sphere. Specifically, Taiwan could prepare for a blockade by stockpiling
critical energy, food, and medical supplies and planning for rationing and finan-
cial contingencies.98 Such preparations would reassure Taiwan’s leadership and
citizenry that they could withstand a blockade, thus reducing the likelihood of
panic and early capitulation. A second objective of comprehensive preparations
and plans would be to delay significantly the point when shortages would force
Taipei to concede.99
Perhaps most important, the United States could use the interim to deliberate
how best to respond. For instance, Washington could withhold the possibility of
intervention as leverage to induce Taipei to behave within acceptable parame-
ters, both before and during crises. With the luxury of time, the United States
might find ways to assist that avoided direct military conflict with China—for
example, supplying critical military material via airlift, much as the Nixon ad-
ministration did for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or by shipping oil
to Taiwan on reflagged, escorted tankers. The United States might, conversely, de-
cide to intervene with conventional force in an overwhelming but carefully phased
manner that took advantage of asymmetrical American advantages. A standing
realization by China that it could well be defeated in such a contingency would
significantly contribute to deterrence.
THE PORCUPINE REPUBLIC
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China either already has or shortly
will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan’s air force and eliminate the
navy at a time of its own choosing. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan’s
defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of die-
sel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised.
Diesel submarines are poor antisubmarine platforms, since with their low
speed and limited underwater endurance they simply cannot search quickly
large volumes of ocean for quiet submarines. These physical restrictions also
limit their versatility as antisurface platforms. They are, for all practical pur-
poses, four-knot minefields. At a cost of over U.S. $1.5 billion each and with in-
determinate delivery dates, conventional submarines also carry significant
opportunity costs, as some in Taipei clearly recognize. Finally, submarines are
no more likely than other naval ships tied up at exposed piers to survive the
opening salvo of a war with China.
Taiwan’s apparent decision to purchase up to twelve submarine-hunting
P-3C aircraft is similarly brought into question. Although these planes can col-
lect valuable information during peacetime and in crisis, in wartime they would
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be sitting ducks while on the ground (though hardened shelters might protect
P-3s) and aloft would require uncontested air superiority to have any chance of
accomplishing their mission.100 In any case, Taipei cannot protect its runways.
Patriot surface-to-air missiles have some utility against short-range ballistic
missiles, but China already has the means to defeat this expensive air-defense
system.
The implication is that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and
building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In
that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bom-
bardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and
defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in
fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses.
Others, however, would entail substantial shifts that some in Taiwan’s navy and
air force would doubtless oppose. Air force leaders would be understandably
loath to admit that their fighters cannot defend Taiwan’s skies; their navy coun-
terparts might similarly resist suggestions that their fleet is acutely vulnerable in
port. Both services’ political champions would certainly challenge the implica-
tions of this article’s analysis. So too would the arms manufacturers who stand to
benefit from the sale of aircraft, ships, and supporting systems to Taiwan.
Yet under present conditions it is doubtful that the people and government of
Taiwan could withstand a determined PRC assault for long. A hasty American
military intervention would be Taiwan’s only hope, but only at the risk of strate-
gic miscalculation and nuclear escalation. A “porcupine” strategy—a Taiwan
that was patently useless to attack—would obviate the need; it would also make a
determined Taipei conspicuously able to deny the objective of a bombardment
or defeat an invasion, thus deterring either scenario. Ability to resist a full-scale
campaign—long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade—for a
substantial amount of time would allow its potential allies to shape their re-
sponses carefully. Above all, demonstrable Taiwanese resilience would diminish
Beijing’s prior confidence in success, strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and re-
duce the risk of the United States being dragged into a conflict with China.101
Meanwhile, a porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequiv-
ocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market
only for defensive systems. Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for
fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint
communiqué declaring that it would “not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those [arms] supplied in recent years . . . and that
it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of
time, to a final resolution.”102
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Finally, and most important, a porcupine approach would shift the responsi-
bility for Taiwan’s defense to Taiwan, rendering U.S. intervention in a
cross-strait battle a last resort instead of the first response. Many observers be-
lieve that Taiwan today relies unduly on a perceived American security guaran-
tee and does not do enough to provide for its own defense. Yet since 2000 the
Kuomintang and the Democratic People’s Party have not framed a defense de-
bate that could produce the open, honest appraisal that is desperately needed if
domestic consensus on a viable defense is to be achieved. A Taiwan that China
perceived could be attacked and damaged but not defeated, at least without un-
acceptably high costs and risks, would enjoy better relations with the United
States and neutralize the threat posed by many of China’s recently acquired mili-
tary capabilities. Unfortunately, political gridlock in Taipei stands in the way of
any such hopes. It is not that Taiwan does not do enough to construct a viable
defense but that it is not doing the right things.
NOTE S
The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Navy, Department of De-
fense, or government. The author gratefully
acknowledges the major contributions of
Craig Koerner and thanks Jonathan Pollack;
Bernard Cole; Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt,
USN (Ret.); Lyle Goldstein; Michael Chase;
Marshall Hoyler; Andrew Erickson; and
Christopher Weuve for their invaluable
suggestions.
1. China’s National Defense in 2004, available at
www.fas.org/. China’s 2006 defense white pa-
per did not emphasize the same point.
2. Many of these improvements have been
proudly displayed on the Internet. See, for
example, the intelligently moderated China
Defense Forum at forum.china-defense.com/.
The annual U.S. Department of Defense re-
ports to Congress on the “Military Power of
the People’s Republic of China” also chroni-
cle many of Beijing’s military developments.
3. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2007 (Washington, D.C.: 23 May 2007), p. 15,
available at www.defenselink.mil; Roger Cliff
et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese
Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for
the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2007), available at www.rand.org;
Ron O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Back-
ground and Issues for Congress (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service [here-
after CRS], 20 July 2007).
4. Wang Yu-yen, “Hu Jintao Says the Only
Task of the CPC Armed Forces Is to Launch
War against Taiwan,” Lien-Ho Pao, 27 Au-
gust 2007, Open Source Center [hereafter
OSC] CPP20070827312001.
5. Wang Shibin, “Guo Boxiong Sets Out PLA
Tasks, Warns ‘Taiwan Independence’
Forces,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 March 2008, p. 1,
OSC CPP20080307710003.
6. Thus, in all probability, an invasion or a
blockade would be preceded by a long-range
precision bombardment. These scenarios
could, and likely would, involve extensive in-
formation warfare operations, as well as “de-
capitation attacks,” in which senior political
and military leaders would be personally tar-
geted, perhaps by assassins or precision-
guided munitions.
7. See, for example, Michael O’Hanlon, “Why
China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” Interna-
tional Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp.
51–86; Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation
M U R R A Y 3 1
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of
Taiwan,” International Security 28, no. 4
(Spring 2000), pp. 125–60; Robert S. Ross,
“Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence,
Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Rela-
tions,” International Security 27, no. 2 (Fall
2002), pp. 48–85; and David A. Shlapak, Da-
vid T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire
Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan
Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000). How-
ever, these studies were published before the
evidence of PLA modernization was fully
apparent.
8. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 12–26.
9. See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen,
“Posing Problems without Catching Up:
China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security
Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4
(Spring 2001), pp. 5–40; and Lyle Goldstein
and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons:
China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” Interna-
tional Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp.
161–96. For a careful, and rather discourag-
ing, analysis of Taiwan’s security situation see
Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History
and Prospects (London: Routledge, 2006).
10. Pape refers to this use of bombardment as
“coercion by denial,” maintaining that such
strategies are much more likely to succeed
than strategies that rely on punishment;
Bombing to Win, pp. 27–35.
11. For details see Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major
U.S. Arms Sales since 1990, CRS Report for
Congress (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 5 July
2005), pp. 17–22.
12. A thoughtful criticism of such offensive sys-
tems is provided by Denny Roy, “Taiwan Per-
ilously Ponders Its Strategic Missile Force,”
Jamestown Foundation China Brief 6, no. 20,
available at jamestown.org/china_brief.
13. A PAC-3 interceptor costs approximately
$3.2 million. Rich Chang, “PAC-3s Will Pro-
tect Taiwan, MND Says,” Taipei Times, 21
March 2005, p. 3, available at www
.taipeitimes.com. Although the cost of Chi-
nese SRBMs is not publicly available, the fact
that the PRC is building over a hundred a
year suggests they are much more affordable
to the PRC than are PAC-3 interceptors to
Taiwan.
14. This would align with the 11 September 2007
speech by Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, to a U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council defense industry conference.
Christensen said that the United States de-
sires a “strong and moderate Taiwan . . . that
maintains the military capacity to withstand
coercion for an extended period of time”;
available at www.state.gov. Further, section
3302 of the Taiwan Relations Act states, “The
President and the Congress shall determine,
in accordance with constitutional processes,
appropriate action by the US in response to
any such danger” (usinfo.state.gov/eap). Such
process would likely take a significant period
of time.
15. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait,” p. 82.
16. Jim Wolf, “Taiwan Submarine Builder Not
Chosen Yet: Envoy,” Reuters, 29 September
2004; prices are in U.S. 2001 dollars. The
complete package offered in response to a
Taiwanese request also included “54 Mark-48
torpedoes, 44 Harpoon submarine-launched
anti-ship cruise missiles, 144 M109A6 Pala-
din self-propelled howitzers, 54 AAV7A1 am-
phibious assault vehicles, AN/ALE-50
electronic countermeasure systems for F-16s,
and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping helicopters”;
Kan, Taiwan, p. 6. Kan’s excellent report con-
tains a comprehensive accounting of the arms
sale’s subsequent tortuous progress.
17. See, for example, “China Opposed to US
Submarine Sale to Taiwan: FM Spokes-
woman,” People’s Daily, 21 November 2001,
available at english.peopledaily.com.cn.
18. Nicholas Kralev, “Election Results Threaten
U.S. Arms Agreement,” Washington Times,
16 December 2004, p. 17.
19. “U.S. Official Warns of ‘Repercussions’ If
Taiwan Fails to Approve Weapons Deal,” As-
sociated Press, 6 October 2004, available at
taiwansecurity.org. Other public pressure
from the United States included statements
by Stephen Young, the director of the Ameri-
can Institute of Taiwan, who called fre-
quently on Taiwan to fund the package. See
Rich Chang, “Time Expiring on Arms Deal:
Congressman,” Taipei Times, 23 February
2006, p. 2, available at www.taipeitimes.com;
and Jane Rickards, “Taiwan Rejects Most of
U.S. Arms Package Offered in 2001,”
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
21
Murray: Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
Washington Post, 16 June 2007. Peter
Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, testified in
2004 to Congress, “We expect Taiwan to go
forward with its plan to pass a ‘Special Bud-
get’ this summer to fund essential missile de-
fense and anti-submarine warfare systems
and programs”; Kan, Taiwan, p. 20, citing
statement before the House International Re-
lations Committee, The Taiwan Relations Act:
The Next 25 Years, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 21
April 2004, note 102.
20. Lu Chao-lung, “US Demands Exorbitant
Price for Purchase of Submarines, Anti-
submarine Planes,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 8
May 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service [hereafter FBIS] CPP20030508000022.
21. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 May 2003.
22. In comparison, the Russians in 2002 sold
eight Project 636M Kilo-class submarines to
the PRC for a reported $1.6 billion. See, for
example, “Sevmachpredpriyatiye Enterprise
Ready to Construct Submarines for Chinese
Navy,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 3
September 2002, FBIS CEP20020903000123.
All eight Kilos were delivered to China by the
end of 2006.
23. “Warning on Arms Purchase Angers Taipei
Opposition,” Reuters, 7 October 2004, avail-
able at taiwansecurity.org.
24. Taiwan’s defense minister, Lee Jye, for exam-
ple, said, “I have said I will resign if the bud-
get is not passed. I am serious”; “Defense
Minister Threatens to Quit over Sub Budget,”
Taipei Times, 15 June 2004, p. 4, available at
www.taipeitimes.com.
25. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Taiwan’s Free Ride on
U.S. Defense,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 23
April 2007, available at www.cato.org.
26. Taiwan apparently decided to buy twelve
P-3Cs; Reuters, “U.S. May Sell Weapons to
Taiwan,” New York Times, 13 September
2007.
27. Shih Shiu-chuan, “Legislature Finally Passes
US Arms Budget,” Taipei Times, 16 June
2007, p. 1, available at www.taipeitimes.com.
28. “By November 2007, the PLA had deployed
between 990 and 1070 CSS-6 and CSS-7
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to gar-
risons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the
size of this force at a rate of more than 100
missiles per year, including variants of these
missiles with improved ranges, accuracies,
and payloads”; U.S. Defense Dept., Annual
Report to Congress: Military Power of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington,
D.C.: 29 February 2008), p. 2. The 2008 DoD
report states (pp. 2, 56) that China has up to
250 DH-10 land-attack cruise missiles. Jane’s
claims a ten-meter-CEP accuracy for these
weapons; “China Tests New Land-Attack
Cruise Missile,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1
October 2004, available at www.Janes.com.
CEP is the radius of a circle within which a
warhead will land at least 50 percent of the
time.
29. Chang, “PAC-3s Will Protect Taiwan, MND
Says,” p. 3.
30. A Taiwan Ministry of National Defense offi-
cial leaked that PAC-3 interceptors have a 0.8
probability of kill; Chang, “PAC-3s Will Pro-
tect Taiwan, MND Says.” By extension, they
also have a probability of miss of 0.2. The
probability of at least one of a pair of PAC-3
interceptors striking their target would there-
fore be 1 – (0.2 × 0.2) = 0.96.
31. Mark A. Stokes, prepared statement before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, China’s Military Modern-
ization and Export Controls Hearings, 109th
Cong., 2nd sess., 16 March 2006, p. 44, avail-
able at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/
transcripts.
32. O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer
Taiwan,” p. 58.
33. Christensen, “Posing Problems without
Catching Up,” p. 26.
34. John Hill, “Missile Race Heightens Tension
across the Taiwan Strait,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, 1 January 2005. This article also re-
ports the Chinese development of land-attack
cruise missiles with ten-meter accuracy.
35. Stokes, prepared statement before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission, p. 44.
36. “Chinese Missiles Aimed at Taiwan Exceeds
[sic] 900,” China Post, 11 September 2007,
available at www.chinapost.com.tw. A 2007
Taiwan article claims newer SRBMs have a
CEP of thirty, or even twenty, meters; see
Cheng Ta-ch’eng, “Taiwan Report on
PRC Missile Threat to World,” Taipei
M U R R A Y 3 3
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
Lu-chun Yueh-k’an, 26 January 2007, OSC
CPP20070524312005. Cheng does not pro-
vide a source for this estimate in his other-
wise well-documented article.
37. Russia’s GLONASS system, which would pre-
sumably be available even if the U.S. GPS
were denied, provides similar accuracies, as
will the even more accurate Galileo system, to
be built by the European Union and China.
China is also putting into orbit its Beidou
navigation satellite system.
38. Scott Bray, Office of Naval Intelligence Public
Affairs Office, “Seapower Questions on the
Chinese Submarine Force,” e-mail to author,
6 March 2007.
39. Stokes relates that “2nd artillery doctrine
stresses surprise and disarming first strikes to
gain the initiative in the opening phase of a
conflict”; Stokes, prepared statement before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Re-
view Commission, p. 44.
40. One close observer’s assessment to the author
was, “I don’t think any of the S-2s are
operable.”
41. See “P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol and Anti-
submarine Warfare Aircraft, USA,” Air Force
Technology, www.airforce-technology.com.
Japan obtained and honed this significant
force during the Cold War to oppose the
threat posed by the Soviet submarine force.
The multimission capability of these aircraft,
however, justifies their continued operation
by Japan and other countries, including the
United States.
42. Adm. Harry D. Train, USN, “An Analysis of
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Campaign,”
Naval War College Review 41, no. 1 (Winter
1988), p. 40.
43. Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkom, and Ron-
ald O’Rourke, China’s Foreign Conventional
Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis,
CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.:
CRS, 10 October 2000), p. 61, available at
www.fas.org. China has twelve Kilo
submarines.
44. See figure A6-6 in Tom Stefanick, Strategic
Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy
(Lexington, Ky.: Institute for Defense and
Disarmament Studies, 1987), p. 278.
Stefanick concludes that a Los Angeles–class
submarine can be detected at ranges from
one to twenty-five nautical miles. If a Kilo-
class diesel submarine is quieter than an im-
proved Los Angeles–class unit, which in turn
must be quieter than an unimproved Los An-
geles, then Stefanick’s graph suggests that de-
tection ranges for a Kilo are on par with those
of Ohio-class SSBNs.
45. Kan, Taiwan, p. 6.
46. Taiwan also has nine Chi Yang (ex-U.S.
Knox-class) frigates, eight Cheung Kung–class
frigates that are copies of the U.S. Oliver Haz-
ard Perry class, six frigates of the Kang Ting
(Lafayette) class, and some fifty missile patrol
craft. See Cole, Taiwan’s Security, pp. 119–34.
47. Ship movements in port would require the
interruption of daily training and mainte-
nance, involve several harbor tugs, and com-
plicate the planning of harbor operations. As
a result, it is somewhat expensive and
generally avoided.
48. See, for example, “Laser Radar (LADAR)
Guidance System,” at the Israeli Aerospace
Industry’s Defense Update: International, On-
line Defense Magazine, www.defense-update
.com/products/l/ladar.htm. I make no claim
that the PRC has this technology but only ob-
serve that high weapons-system accuracy is
no longer a monopoly of the United States.
49. Bruce Bennett, “The Emerging Ballistic Mis-
sile Threat: Global and Regional Ramifica-
tions,” in Emerging Threats, Force Structures,
and the Role of Air Power in Korea, ed. Natalie
W. Crawford and Chung-in Moon (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), p. 193.
50. The technology for such weapons is not cutting-
edge. The British JP233, used in the Gulf
War, for example, was an aircraft-delivered
anti-airfield munition that dropped thirty 34
kg cratering bomblets and 215 2.4 kg anti-
personnel mines. The bomblets had two
stages—the first used a shaped charge to blow
a hole in the concrete runway into which the
second stage would fall, exploding to create a
large crater. The antipersonnel mines were
sufficiently strong and sensitive to disable
heavy equipment passing nearby, slowing
runway repair. The JP233 weighed approxi-
mately 1,587 kg; see “JP233,” Wikipedia,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JP233. Germany’s
STABO runway-penetrating submunitions
weigh just 16 kg each. China’s CSS-7 SRBM is
thought to be able to carry 800 kg warheads
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
23
Murray: Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
at least 174 miles, which suggests that in
terms of mass delivered, two SRBMs could
create the same airfield damage as a single
JP233. Similarly, a single CSS-7 could also
carry approximately the mass of forty-eight
STABOs, though its ability to carry that
much volume is uncertain. See “CSS-7,”
Missilethreat.com (Claremont Institute).
51. An informed discussion of this idea can be
found in Lt. Cdr. William E. Bunn, USN,
“Shock and Awe with Chinese Characteris-
tics,” Chinese Military Update 3, no. 2 (March
2006). Readers who type “Hualien” into
Google Earth can observe for themselves the
location of the hardened aircraft revetments
at Taiwan’s Chashan and connected Ta-
Shan air bases.
52. See “Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF),”
TaiwanAirPower.org; and Cole, Taiwan’s Se-
curity, pp. 105–18. Cole points out that Tai-
wan also has ninety or more F-5 aircraft but
notes that these largely obsolete aircraft are
used mostly for pilot training.
53. Knowledgeable individuals who have in-
spected Taiwan’s aircraft shelters have ob-
served to the author that they are
“inadequate in coverage and strength.”
54. Oliver August, “Secret World That Guards
Taiwan,” London Times, 23 May 2001. Google
Earth images of Taitung’s underground shel-
ters, which are approximately two thousand
feet long in total, suggest that they can pro-
tect a substantial number of aircraft.
55. This is apparently consistent with at least
some Chinese operational concepts. See the
discussion in Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s
Lair, pp. 62, 81–109.
56. See U.S. Air Force Dept., “Mission Planning,”
Pilot Operating Procedures: F-16, Multi-
Command Instruction 11-F16, sec. 2.2.2, 21
April 1995, available at www.fas.org. Despite
this, in U.S. doctrine the minimum operating
strip for flight operations is fifteen meters
wide and 1,525 meters long (or fifty by five
thousand feet). This additional length is more
important during landings than on takeoff.
See “Aviation Facilities,” Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, www.fas.org.
57. Cole reports a Taiwanese Ministry of Na-
tional Defense estimate that a 500 kg unitary
warhead from an SRBM would create in a
runway a crater ten meters deep and twenty
wide. Taiwan’s Security, p. 113.
58. A 1999 RAND study estimated that dozens of
missiles with nonpenetrating submunitions
bomblets could attack a U.S. air base effec-
tively; John Stillion and David Orletsky,
Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-
Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), pp. xiii, 13, 14.
I contend that runway-penetrating
submunitions further reduce that number.
59. “KAB-500Kr TV-Guided Bomb,”
SinoDefence.com.
60. “These warheads include things like, for ex-
ample, submunitions, terminally guided
submunitions for example, for runway
cratering in order to pin down an air force on
the ground or to disrupt naval operations”;
Stokes, prepared statement before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission, p. 42.
61. The Washington, D.C., company Rapid Mat
U.S. was awarded a $43 million contract in
2002 to provide rapid-runway-repair kits to
Taiwan by the end of 2004. See the U.S. De-
fense Dept., Press Release 145-2, 22 March
2002, available at www.defenselink.mil/
contracts. The company’s website, www
.coltrapidmat.com, lists the materials used in
rapid-runway-repair kits.
62. E-mail to the author from a knowledgeable
individual who visited the base.
63. See, for example, Cole, Taiwan’s Security, pp.
74–78, 89–90, 102, and 111–12.
64. Ibid., pp. 111–12.
65. This occurred in 2007 and in 2004. See
“Planes Land on Highway as Taiwan Simu-
lates Attack from Rival China,” China Post,
15 May 2007, available at www.chinapost
.com.tw; and “Taiwan Turns Highway into
Flyway,” Associated Press, 22 July 2004, avail-
able at taiwansecurity.org.
66. Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, Dire Strait? p.
33.
67. For a description of the threat posed by ad-
vanced Russian SAMs see John A. Tirpak,
“The Double-Digit SAMs,” Air Force Maga-
zine Online 84, no. 6 (June 2001), www
.afa.org/magazine. The quoted phrase is that
of Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, USAF, in Eric
M U R R A Y 3 5
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
Talmadge, “While U.S. Is Bogged Down in
Iraq China Seen Making Big Military
Strides,” Japan Times, 1 October 2007, avail-
able at search.japantimes.co.jp.
68. “SA-N-6/20 ‘Grumble’ (S-300 Fort/Rif),”
Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 29 December
2006, available at www.Janes.com; and U.S.
Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress:
Military Power of the People’s Republic of
China 2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006),
p. 5.
69. See Richard D. Fisher, “Chinese Aspects of
Singapore’s IMDEX Naval Technology
Show,” International Assessment and Strategy
Center, 20 June 2007, available at www
.strategycenter.net.
70. See, for example, “China Orders 6 Giant Rus-
sian ‘Zubr’ Hovercraft,” Defense Industry
Daily, 13 September 2007, available at www
.defenseindustrydaily.com.
71. “Yuting-II Class (LSTH),” Jane’s Fighting
Ships, 29 January 2007, available at www
.Janes.com.
72. O’Hanlon’s discussion in “Why China Can-
not Conquer Taiwan” of the difficulties fac-
ing an invasion of Taiwan is still quite good,
although his conclusion regarding the surviv-
ability of Taiwan’s air force during bombard-
ment has been overcome by developments.
73. James Mulvenon has been making this point
since at least 2000. Steven Mufson, “U.S.
Faces a Dilemma on Taiwan: Warship Sale
Could Fuel China Tensions,” Washington
Post, 14 April 2000, available at taiwansecurity
.org. A hardened aircraft shelter in Europe
cost approximately four million dollars in
1999; see Stillion and Orletsky, Airbase
Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile
and Ballistic-Missile Attacks, p. 31. Shlapak,
Orletsky, and Wilson strongly advocate hard-
ening not only aircraft revetments but also air
base fuel-tank farms, fuel distribution sys-
tems, and critical maintenance facilities; Dire
Strait? pp. 32–33. Bernard Cole too argues
strongly that Taiwan should harden critical
facilities, in Taiwan’s Security, pp. 113–14.
74. Restoration of power to northern Taiwan
businesses and residences took weeks. Risk
Management Solutions, Event Report
Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake (n.d.), pp.
13–15, available at www.rms.com/
publications/Taiwan_Event.pdf.
75. Although this would be a significant commit-
ment, it is not entirely without precedent. Is-
raeli law mandates that all new houses have a
“safe room” designed to withstand a bomb
blast.
76. “And Now, the War Forecast,” Economist
Technology Quarterly, 17 September 2005, p.
23.
77. The United States reportedly dedicated nearly
2,500 missions to finding and destroying
Scuds, with no successes. Mark Thompson,
“The Great SCUD Hunt,” Time, 15 Decem-
ber 2002, available at www.time.com.
78. Because an anchored ship swings, or pivots,
around its anchor, it cannot be struck by war-
heads aimed at coordinates. It could be hit,
however, by area-covering submunitions or
guided warheads, perhaps from antiship
cruise missiles, to which China has devoted
much effort.
79. Missile craft sheltered in facilities modeled on
Germany’s famously impervious submarine
shelters in Brest, France, during World War
II would be vulnerable to cruise missiles,
however, or to the effects of thermobaric
warheads, which could be delivered via mis-
siles or aircraft. See Jonathan Marcus, “Anal-
ysis: How Thermobaric Bombs Work,” BBC
News, 4 March 2002, available at news.bbc
.co.uk.
80. Miloševi withstood the destruction caused
by 6,728 U.S. precision-guided munitions
striking approximately six thousand aim
points before conceding to demands. Taiwan,
with an island’s additional defensive charac-
teristics, ought to be able to do even better.
See Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War
for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assess-
ment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001),
pp. 87–88, note 4.
81. See “Army, Taiwan,” Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, 23
April 2007, table, “Air Defense Weapons,”
available at www.Janes.com.
82. For a description of this system, see “Surface
Launched (SL)AMRAAM Complementary
Low Altitude Weapon System (CLAWS),”
Defense Update, www.defense-update
.com/products.
3 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
25
Murray: Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
83. During the 1982 Falklands War, HMS Shef-
field was sunk and HMS Glamorgan badly
damaged by hits by single Exocet ASCMs.
The USS Stark (FFG 31) nearly sank after be-
ing hit by two Iraqi Exocet ASCMs in 1987,
and Israel’s Sa’ar-class corvette Ahi Hanit re-
tired from battle after being struck by a
Chinese-model C-802 ASCM in 2006. The
Exocet and C-802 both have 165 kg (363-
pound) warheads.
84. The one exception to this statement is the
solitary Lazhou-class LPD, which is equipped
with the AK-630 Gatling-gun point-defense
system.
85. These radars would be vulnerable to HARM
systems, such as Harpy subsonic unmanned
drones or China’s supersonic KH-31 Krypton
missiles. To counter these weapons coastal
surveillance radars could be mobile, operated
in “blinking” modes from hardened loca-
tions, or protected by decoys.
86. Taiwan is developing the 180-mile-range
Hsiung Fen III supersonic ASCM; it dis-
played this weapon during a 13 October 2007
parade.
87. Sofia Wu, “Apache Helicopter Most Suited to
Taiwan’s Defense Needs: Army,” ROC Cen-
tral News Agency, 10 July 2007, available at
www.globalsecurity.org.
88. The MLRS can fire a multitude of rockets
with a variety of lethal warheads. Many of
these variants could greatly assist Taiwan’s
defenses, but as presently configured some
have ranges that theoretically would allow
them to strike China, especially from
Penghu. See “MLRS Multiple Launch
Rocket System, USA,” Army Technology,
www.army-technology.com/projects.
89. See, for example, Sandra I. Erwin, “Shallow-
Water Mines Remain ‘Achilles’ Heel’ of U.S.
Navy,” National Defense (January 2002),
available at www.nationaldefensemagazine
.org.
90. Commercially available mines can be de-
ployed by two people on the back of a pickup
truck. The mines detonate with sufficient
force to flip over an amphibious tank.
91. “Army, Taiwan.”
92. Cole, Taiwan’s Security, p. 79.
93. For a careful explanation of other impedi-
ments to Taiwan’s developing an effective,
all-volunteer army, see ibid., pp. 72–90,
102–103.
94. “The biggest unknown is, will they fight?”
This is how one retired U.S. military officer
who has extensively inspected the Taiwanese
army, interviewing both leaders and rank-
and-file members, summarized the issue in
an interview with the author. See also Cole,
Taiwan’s Security, pp. 88–89.
95. In order to maximize the chances of success,
such a campaign would likely be either pre-
ceded or accompanied by bombardments de-
signed to destroy the air force and navy, by
information warfare, and by decapitation.
96. For example, in 2007 Taiwan had only one
LNG terminal, at Yungan, Kaohsiung. An-
other is being built in Taichung Harbor, with
completion slated for 2009. Taiwan has only
four oil refineries. See Taiwan Ministry of
Energy, “Energy Supply,” The Energy Situa-
tion in Taiwan, Republic of China, www
.moeaboe.gov.tw; and U.S. Energy Dept.,
“Taiwan Country Analysis Brief,” Energy In-
formation Administration, www.eia.doe.gov.
97. “Taiwan Country Analysis Brief.”
98. For example, Taiwan’s current crude oil
stocks are above ground in vulnerable tank
farms. An alternative would be to stockpile
refined oil products either underground or in
numerous smaller tanks, including indoor
tanks at the points of consumption.
99. Substitution, rationing, and cessation of non-
essential activities can allow determined
blockaded populations to resist for extended
periods of time, as numerous historical ex-
amples, including Malta and Japan in World
War II and Germany in World War I, have
shown.
100. E-3 AWACS aircraft, which have 145-foot
wingspans and are 144 feet long and 42 feet
high, are too large to shelter; see David
Shlapak, “Projecting Power in a China-
Taiwan Contingency: Implications for USAF
and USN Collaboration,” in Coping with the
Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and
the U.S. Military, ed. Stuart Johnson and
Duncan Long (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense Univ. Center for Technology and
National Security Policy, December 2007),
M U R R A Y 3 7
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
p. 90, available at www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/pubs/
CopingwithDragon.pdf. P-3Cs, which have
ninety-eight-foot wingspans and are 115 feet
long and thirty-three feet high, may also be
too large to shelter.
101. This is one of the fundamental points made
by Ted Galen Carpenter in Let Taiwan De-
fend Itself, Cato Policy Analysis 313
(Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 24 Au-
gust 1998), available at www.cato.org/pubs.
I agree with much of his analysis and rea-
soning but disagree on the subject of the
United States making available weapons of
offensive character.
102. “Joint Communiqué of the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China,”
17 August 1982, U.S. Information Access
program, available at usinfo.state.gov/eap/.
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
27
Murray: Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3
